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1 – Introduction
Philosophers of science have typically come in two stripes: 
Scientific realists endorse the thesis that science is capable of 
providing an accurate description of the unobservable world. 
Anti-realists, on the other hand, state that science aids our 
interests, but that we should not go any further in thinking 
that science’s description of the world is true. Both camps, 
however, face intractable problems. First, traditional scien-
tific realism has come under scrutiny of the pessimistic me-
ta-induction since most of the entities appealed to in previ-
ous scientific theories have been rejected. Second, although 
anti-realists adopt the lesson of the pessimistic meta-induc-
tion, they are unable to provide an adequate explanation for 
why science has enjoyed such experimental success. There is 
a third position, structural realism, which has attempted to 
overcome these challenges. 
Worrall’s (1989) essay serves as the catalyst for the structur-
al realist movement, although elements of the theory can be 
found in Poincaré (2001) and even Kant (1989). Worrall ac-
knowledges that the pessimistic meta-induction poses seri-
ous obstacles for the scientific realist. Yet, he does not want 
to endorse either anti-realism or instrumentalism, since it 
would have to be something like a “miracle” for science to 
be as successful as it has been if either is true. Instead of un-
derstanding the task of science involving the development of 
descriptions of unobservable entities, the structural realist 
understands science as aiming to provide an accurate de-
scription of its structure. 
Although the change in theories requires a shift in our under-
standing of what entities exist (e.g., the aether), the mathe-
matical structure of scientific theories remains mostly intact. 
In cases such as these, Demopoulos and Friedman (1985), 
Morganti (2004), Poincaré (2001), Russell (1927), Votsis 
(2005), and Worrall (1989) endorse epistemic structural re-
alism, which states that at most we can know the structure 
of the world even though there is more to reality than struc-
tures. Epistemic structural realism is to be contrasted with 
the ontic structural realist position held by French (2014) and 
Ladyman and Ross (2007), which states that all that exists are 
structures. This paper focuses on the ontic structural realist 
position that Ladyman and Ross advocate and their endorse-
ment of radically naturalized metaphysics. In particular, 
this paper aims to understand how ontic structural realists 
benefit from non-radically naturalized forms of metaphysics. 
The discussion unfolds as follows: Section 1 provides a brief 
discussion of the formulation of radically naturalized meta-
physics defended by Ladyman and Ross, which has as its 
tasks unifying the sciences and modeling the objective struc-
ture of reality; Section 2 outlines two key regulative principles 
for radically naturalized metaphysics: the principle of natu-
Ontic structural realists Ladyman and Ross (2007) endorse the view that the only 
metaphysical tasks worth pursuing are to unify the sciences and model the objective 
structure of reality. This form of radically naturalized metaphysics, however, depends 
upon the principle of naturalistic closure. In this paper I argue that the principle of 
naturalistic closure is at odds with radically naturalized metaphysics since it is a non- 
naturalized metaphysical principle, claiming that radically naturalized metaphysics is 
not the only form of metaphysics worth doing. In particular, the principle of naturalis- 
tic closure requires that a metaphysical claim M at t be of service to some scientific 
hypothesis H. The principle, however, does not state when M must be of service to H. 
It is possible for a metaphysical claim at t to be of service to a scientific hypothesis at 
t+n. Furthermore, the principle of naturalistic closure is not a direct result of scientific 
inquiry. Yet, as I argue, the principle of naturalistic closure is a metaphysical claim. 
Thus, motivating the position that metaphysics is not restricted to the tasks of unifying 
the sciences and modeling the objective structure of reality, but more importantly that 
it should not be.
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ralistic closure and primacy of physics constraint; Section 3 
takes into consideration some implications of these regula-
tive principles for the purposes of unifying the sciences and 
modeling the objective structure of reality; I then conclude 
with a brief discussion of why ontic structural realists should 
be sympathetic to the pursuance of other metaphysical ap-
proaches. Although for different reasons, Hawley makes a 
similar point regarding analytic metaphysics’ abilities to con-
tribute to Ladyman and Ross’ project (Stanford et al. 2010). 
2 – Radically Naturalized 
Metaphysics
At first glance, ontic structural realists might be thought to 
be entirely hostile towards metaphysics since there are many 
commonalities between logical positivism and ontic struc-
tural realism. The statements “The criteria of adequacy for 
metaphysical systems have clearly come apart from anything 
to do with the truth. Rather they are internal and peculiar 
to philosophy, they are semi-aesthetic, and they have more 
in common with the virtues of story-writing than with sci-
ence” (Ladyman and Ross 2007, p.13) and “We think that 
[Neo-Scholastic metaphysicians] are indeed doing nothing 
but revealing properties of themselves and don’t usually re-
alize it” are reminiscent of Ayer’s remark that “it is fashion-
able to speak of the metaphysician as a misplaced poet. As his 
statements have no literal meaning, they are not subject to 
any criteria of truth or falsehood: but they may still serve to 
express, or arouse, emotion, and thus be subject to ethical or 
aesthetic standards” (Ayer 1946, p.44). 
These similarities illustrate some of the motivation behind 
the ontic structural realists’ hostility towards much of con-
temporary analytic metaphysics, but many positivists would 
be resistant to the ontic structural realist’s slogan that all that 
exists is structure since it is neither a tautology nor is empir-
ically verifiable. So, even though ontic structural realists in 
many ways revive the spirit of positivism, they are engaged in 
different projects. 
There have been many attempts at offering a naturalized 
metaphysics. As Macarthur (2010, p.124) indicates, natural-
ism has been defended by the likes of Armstrong (1980), De-
vitt (1984), Dretske (1995), and Papineau (1993). Although 
generally understood as being advocates for a radically natu-
ralized metaphysics, Ladyman and Ross do not clearly distin-
guish radically naturalistic metaphysics from other forms of 
naturalistic metaphysics, since they take their construal to be 
the correct formulation. In Ladyman and Ross’s formulation, 
radically naturalized metaphysics has the task of unifying the 
sciences and is the only kind of metaphysics suited to model 
the objective structure of reality. These tasks are further elu-
cidated by two regulative principles: the primacy of physics 
constraint and the principle of naturalistic closure.
3 – Regulative principles
First, the primacy of physics constraint (hereafter ‘PPC’), 
states that any metaphysics or special science that is at odds 
with our best contemporary physics “should automatically be 
rejected for that reason alone. Fundamental physical hypoth-
eses are not symmetrically hostage to the conclusions of the 
special sciences” (Ladyman and Ross 2007, p.44). The PPC 
serves as a constraint on how radically naturalized meta-
physics should unify the sciences and model the objective 
structure of reality by appealing to our best contemporary 
physics. Furthermore, PPC supports ontic structural realism 
in its claim that all that exists is structure. By adopting our 
best contemporary physics, which Ladyman and Ross claim 
is quantum field theory, we then begin to accept an ontology 
not of things but of structures. For this reason, the appeal to 
quantum field theory begins to undermine the very project 
of constructing an ontology, properly understood as study-
ing things, which indicates that there are other ways of doing 
metaphysics.1  French (1998) makes a similar point.
Second, the PPC functions in tandem with the principle of 
naturalistic closure (hereafter ‘PNC’), which states that  
[a]ny new metaphysical claim that is to be taken seriously at 
time t should be motivated by, and only by, the service it would 
perform, if true, in showing how two or more specific scientif-
ic hypotheses, at least one of which is drawn from fundamental 
physics, jointly explain more than the sum of what is explained 
by the two hypotheses taken separately, where this is interpreted 
by reference to the following terminological stipulations: 
Stipulation: A ‘scientific hypothesis’ is understood as an hypoth-
esis that is taken seriously by institutionally bona fide science 
at t. 
Stipulation: A ‘specific scientific hypothesis’ is one that has been 
directly investigated and confirmed by institutionally bona fide 
scientific activity prior to t or is one that might be investigated at 
or after t, in the absence of constraints resulting from engineer-
ing, physiological, or economic restrictions or their combination, 
as the primary object of attempted verification, falsification, or 
quantitative refinement, where this activity is part of an objec-
tive research project fundable by a bona fide scientific research 
funding body. 
Stipulation: An ‘objective research project’ has the primary pur-
pose of establishing objective facts about nature that would, if 
accepted on the basis of the project, be expected to continue to 
be accepted by inquirers aiming to maximize their stock of true 
beliefs, notwithstanding shifts in the inquirers’ practical, com-
mercial, or ideological preferences. (Ladyman and Ross 2007, 
Moving Beyond Unification 
and Modeling: a Reconsi-
deRation of Radically na-
tURalized Metaphysics
1 - Thanks to Alex Levine for bringing this point to my attention.
2 - I quote here at length since the specific stipulations will play a significant role in my criticism of limiting metaphysics in the way that Ladyman and Ross 
recommend.
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pp. 37-8)2 
The initial formulation of the PNC indicates the conditions 
that are needed if we are to endorse a metaphysical claim. It 
is in the third stipulation, though, that we see how the PNC 
supports radically naturalized metaphysics. The aim of the 
PNC is to determine which metaphysical claims are about 
the nature of the world as described by science. Furthermore, 
since those metaphysical claims would have been acquired 
through scientific processes,which Ladyman and Ross claim 
are the most reliable “epistemic filters” (2007, p.37), the re-
sulting “stock of true beliefs” will itself be unified. Since those 
beliefs are the result of scientific processes, the unification 
of those beliefs will offer insight as to how we can unify the 
sciences. It is not immediately clear, though, how the meta-
physical projects that are determined by the PNC also lead to 
a formulation of ontic structural realism, since ontic structur-
al realism primarily has as its motivation the problems that 
befall scientific realism. Ladyman and Ross argue that ontic 
structural realism is not an ad hoc response to theory change, 
but is a result of our best physics (Ladyman and Ross 2007, 
p.67). More work should be done to show why they believe 
this argument succeeds, but it is not immediately relevant. 
So, I will table it for the present discussion.
The second stipulation of the PNC requires additional clar-
ification as to how the PNC is to go about restricting meta-
physics, since, although the PNC requires that a metaphys-
ical claim M at t be of service to some scientific hypothesis 
H, the PNC does not state when M must be of service to H. 
For this reason, there is the lingering possibility that M at 
t be of service to some H at t
+n
. To make this more precise: 
The PNC states that for a metaphysical claim to be taken se-
riously when it is proposed at t that it should be motivated by 
“and only by” the role it would serve in making two or more 
scientific hypotheses more explanatorily powerful. Yet, the 
scientific hypotheses that would justify the employment of a 
metaphysical claim do not need to be presently investigated 
or confirmed at t. Instead, the stipulation only requires that 
the scientific hypothesis be a candidate for investigation (and 
not confirmation) at a later time t
+n
.
 
As I will show in the next section, this will have significant 
implications for the claim that metaphysicians should only 
engage in radically naturalized metaphysics. Rather than 
being restrictive as to which forms of metaphysics should be 
endorsed, the PNC (as formulated) leads to the endorsement 
of multiple metaphysical projects that Ladyman and Ross 
would not endorse. This claim has the further implication 
that the ontic structural realist should not be too quick to re-
ject other forms of metaphysics, and that the possibility of 
justifying other forms of metaphysics will be a positive, albeit 
resisted, result.  
4 – Unification and Modeling
Assuming that radically naturalized metaphysics is the only 
adequate form of metaphysics set to the task of unifying the 
sciences and modeling the objective structure of reality, there 
are reasons that we should not believe that radically natural-
ized metaphysics is the only kind of metaphysics worth doing. 
I am also assuming that Ladyman and Ross are correct in 
their characterization of radically naturalized metaphysics. 
This assumption makes the present argument stronger—
even if radically naturalized metaphysics is the only form 
of metaphysics capable of x, it is not the only sort of meta-
physics worth doing. The projects that radically naturalized 
metaphysics is concerned with accomplishing are worthwhile 
projects, but the justification for the claim that such meta-
physics is possible is not found in radically naturalized meta-
physics itself. The justification will be found in some other 
metaphysical hypothesis which is itself not restrained by the 
PNC, thereby suggesting that the PNC is not sufficient for 
radically naturalized metaphysics. I am, however, assuming 
that the PNC is at least necessary for radically naturalized 
metaphysics. 
Radically naturalized metaphysics requires the presuppo-
sition that the sciences are capable of unification for the 
metaphysician to be justifiably set to the task of unifying the 
sciences. This presupposition, however, is not explanatorily 
significant when combined with scientific hypotheses—indi-
cating that it is not immediately endorsed by the PNC. Given 
two hypotheses H
1
 and H
2
, where H
2
 is derived from funda-
mental physics, and given the claim C that the sciences are 
unified, we find that there is no additional service had by the 
conjunction H
1
 & H
2
 & C that H
1
 & H
2
 on its own does not pro-
vide. A case in which C adds any additional explanatory force 
is if the specific why-question under consideration is why do 
two hypotheses about the world from two different sciences 
aid us in an explanation?
Why might Ladyman and Ross, then, be concerned with the 
project of unification? They appear to be taking a lead from 
Kitcher’s own account of explanation (Ladyman and Ross 
2007, p. 32 and 261). Kitcher argues that we are able to iden-
tify the unified causal structure of the world, since “to explain 
is to fit the phenomena into a unified picture insofar as we 
can” (Kitcher 1989, p.500). This is not a claim about the uni-
fication of the sciences; it is an attempt to describe the re-
lationship between causation and explanation by “critically 
elucidating consilience networks across the sciences” (Lady-
man and Ross 2007, 27). The claim that the world is causally 
unified in a way such that our explanations can offer insights 
to that causal structure may offer some motivation for rad-
ically naturalized metaphysics, but identifying networked 
consilience networks is not the same as unifying the scienc-
es—doing so only aids in identifying consistencies among the 
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sciences. Furthermore, the claim that the world is unified is 
not to be found in the PNC itself and, more importantly, ap-
pears to be in violation of the PPC since fundamental physics 
does not tell us that the world is unified. 
As Dupré (1993) and Cartwright (1999) have been at pains 
to argue, our understanding of the world, if we are to under-
stand the world through the lens of science, is to see a “dap-
pled world, a world rich in different things, with different 
natures, behaving in different ways” (Cartwright 1999, p.1). 
Their arguments further illustrate the contentiousness of the 
thesis that it is possible to identify networked consilience re-
lationships in a way that results in thinking that unification 
is possible. Ladyman and Ross are aware of the arguments 
offered by Dupré and Cartwright (Ladyman and Ross 2007, 
p. 6). Their rejection of the dappled view, however, is not ac-
complished by disputing the specific arguments, but attempt-
ed by critiquing the motivations for endorsing a non-unified 
account. The arguments offered by Cartwright and Dupré are 
much more sophisticated than Ladyman and Ross suggest—
there is much more work needed to show why Dupré and 
Cartwright are mistaken. My own view is that Dupré’s and 
Cartwright’s arguments indicate why we should not look to 
science to offer a unified account of nature. Instead, I take the 
presuppositions underlying the unified view to be metaphys-
ical—presuppositions that provide a valuable service to the 
sciences. To clarify, the presupposition that nature is unified 
is a metaphysical thesis and not a scientific one. 
Furthermore, not all scientists agree that unification is itself 
a serious scientific hypothesis. Although some scientists (e.g., 
Weinberg (1993) and Greene (2011)) do argue that unifica-
tion is the project of science and is a serious hypothesis wor-
thy of scientific pursuit, there are others (e.g., Woit (2006) 
and Smolin (2006)) who appear skeptical of the enterprise 
of unifying the sciences. The contentiousness surrounding 
the possibility of unification makes it unclear if unification 
is a scientific hypothesis in the same sense as what scientists 
mean by ‘scientific hypothesis’ or if unification is a scientific 
hypothesis because some scientists believe that unification is 
possible.
 
It appears to be the latter since there does not appear to be 
substantial evidence to warrant the belief that the sciences 
are unifiable. Furthermore, there does not appear to be any 
way we would be able to falsify or confirm the claim that the 
sciences are unified. At any point at which we might believe 
that the sciences have been unified, if we are capable of rec-
ognizing such a state, there may be other phenomena that 
have yet to be discovered requiring another science that is 
not part of the unified picture. As things currently stand, La-
dyman and Ross require additional evidence to substantiate 
the claim that one of the main tasks of metaphysics is the uni-
fication of the sciences and that such unification is possible.
An additional worry for the project of unification is that many 
previous attempts at unification have been inadequate to the 
task. In many cases, the more attempts we make at unifica-
tion, the more difficult the project becomes. For example, the 
project of unification, at least in physics, appeared to have 
only required finding a connection between general relativ-
ity and quantum mechanics. Now, since quantum mechan-
ics has itself become further diversified into such areas as 
quantum loop theory, quantum gravity, and quantum field 
theory (which has itself been diversified into quantum elec-
trodynamics and quantum chromodynamics), we need to 
first unify these fields before attempting to unify quantum 
mechanics with general relativity. The project, though, of in-
terpreting these different fields in a way that will assist us in 
determining which formulation provides accurate models is 
itself problematic.
 
I am not arguing that all attempts at unification are inade-
quate. Some accounts of unifying quantum mechanics and 
molecular chemistry are promising (Bishop 2005).3 A com-
plete account of unification of the kind that Ladyman and 
Ross endorse, however, requires more instances of unifica-
tion than are currently available to establish the PNC. The 
lesson to be gained is that the PNC is not sufficient for estab-
lishing radically naturalized metaphysics.
The ontic structural realist can accommodate this lesson by 
taking into account the second stipulation of the PNC by sug-
gesting that the scientific hypotheses we are concerned with 
are those that might be investigated later than the time at 
which the metaphysical claim is under consideration. Rather 
than the metaphysician stating that her projects are entire-
ly detached from science and that they do not bear on each 
other in any significant way, the metaphysician would be in a 
better position to state that although her findings or theories 
may not be informative to any current scientific hypothesis, 
there may be one that will be investigated later that might be 
related. French and McKenzie (2012) make a similar obser-
vation regarding metaphysical theories of laws and modal-
ity being applicable to contemporary physics. Furthermore, 
since the scientific hypotheses that we are concerned with are 
only those that might be investigated, the hypotheses do not 
actually need to be investigated to vindicate the metaphysical 
claim in question. For this reason, it is only the possibility of 
there being a scientific hypothesis that would be investigated 
that warrants the consideration of the metaphysical claim. 
For example, Heraclides Ponticus’ proposal that the earth 
rotates and Aristarchus of Samos’ geometric formulation of 
heliocentrism were both at odds with the received views of 
that time (i.e., Aristotelian physics and geocentrism), but 
both proved useful in the development of contemporary cos-
mology.4 
To rephrase the metaphysician’s position in a way that is in 
accordance with the PNC: Metaphysicians can proceed a pri-
ori in the investigation of matters upon which they claim sci-
3 -  Thanks to a referee for bringing this point to my attention.
4-  Thanks to Doug Jesseph for providing me with these examples.
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ence does not [yet] bear. This formulation includes two sens-
es of ‘a priori’—a type of thinking and our abilities to address 
metaphysical issues before they occur in scientific contexts.5 
This weakens the sense in which metaphysics ought to be di-
rectly dependent upon science if it is only dependent upon 
the possibility of scientific hypotheses being investigated and 
strengthens the extent to which science is dependent upon 
metaphysics since the possibility of scientific hypotheses will 
be justified by metaphysical theories about the nature of the 
world and what the future might be like given the present sci-
entific data.
 
The way(s) in which science is dependent upon metaphysics 
is elucidated by the way(s) in which ontic structural realism 
is itself dependent upon metaphysical theses. By showing 
how a view of the philosophy of science is dependent upon 
metaphysical theses we can then infer how science is itself 
dependent upon those same theses. This outcome is due to 
the philosophy of science having as one of its roles the justifi-
cation of methodological approaches to science, in which case 
the metaphysical theses that justify the methods employed in 
the philosophy of science, in turn, justify the methodological 
approaches to science.
 
There are at least two ways in which ontic structural realism 
is dependent upon metaphysical projects that are not directly 
aimed at the unification of the sciences or modeling the ob-
jective structure of reality. First, part of the justification for 
ontic structural realism arises from the PNC itself. Radically 
naturalized metaphysics, however, is a result of the PNC—not 
the other way around. The PNC determines what is a meta-
physically worthwhile project by determining the metaphys-
ical claims we ought to accept—namely, those that result in 
the unification of the sciences or the modeling of the objective 
structure of reality.
 
Furthermore, the PNC is itself not justified by only looking 
at science. The PNC is concerned with which metaphysical 
claims should be entertained, not which scientific claims 
should be justified or how to go about practicing science. In 
other words, the PNC is about metaphysics—or to use the 
contemporary phrase, the PNC is a claim in the domain of 
metametaphysics. Metametaphysics, however, is metaphys-
ics. Metaphysics is the field of inquiry concerned with funda-
mental aspects of reality. Among these aspects are the kinds 
of statements we should adopt in our metaphysics and the 
way to go about investigating reality.
 
Similarly to scientists, metaphysicians should have a good 
understanding of their tools and methods. Developing such 
an understanding is to be ensnared in metaphysical activities. 
For this reason, a discussion of which metaphysical claims 
ought to be entertained or considered relevant, as deter-
mined by the PNC, is still itself a metaphysical project—even 
though it happens to be a project that is not directly in line 
with radically naturalized metaphysics. More importantly, 
determining which metaphysical claims we should take se-
riously is a worthwhile metaphysical project, which is itself 
not directly aimed at the unification of the sciences or the 
modeling of the objective structure of reality. Granted, the 
result of establishing the PNC provides support for a radi-
cally naturalized metaphysics, but the establishment of the 
PNC is on its own a worthwhile endeavor. This result sug-
gests that there is room for metaphysics that does not directly 
concern itself with projects as set forward by radically natu-
ralized metaphysics. Furthermore, since radically naturalized 
metaphysics depends upon the PNC and Ladyman and Ross 
defend a radically naturalized metaphysics, they should not 
seek to restrict the very forms of metaphysics that have led 
to the establishment of the regulative principles upon which 
radically naturalized metaphysics depends.
 
Even if the ontic structural realist is still willing to reject the 
suggestion that other forms of metaphysical projects are 
worthwhile, she would do well to observe in which ways the 
very possibility of unifying the sciences and the possibility of 
modeling the objective structure of reality are both depen-
dent upon metaphysical developments outside of radically 
naturalized metaphysics. I have already discussed how the 
unification of science is itself not directly a result of our cur-
rent best sciences. There is room, though, for a discussion of 
how the project of modeling the objective structure of reality 
is itself a metaphysical project.
To engage in the project of modeling the objective structure 
of reality requires the realist thesis that there is an objective 
reality and that reality has a structure capable of being mod-
eled. If we look at the sciences, as the PNC recommends, and 
if we look specifically to fundamental physics, as recommend-
ed by the PPC, our best scientific theories do not say anything 
about there being an objective reality that possesses a struc-
ture. This claim is consistent with van Fraassen (1998, 2007, 
and 2008), who has argued that at best our scientific theories 
“save the phenomena” but do not go any further in describing 
reality itself. I am in agreement at this point that if we only 
look at science there is no reason to infer something about the 
structure of reality or that reality has a structure. I do believe 
that there is an objective structure to reality that science does 
help us understand, but this is due to metaphysical sympa-
thies and not the result of understanding science. Similarly, 
the ontic structural realist should acknowledge that neither 
the PNC nor PPC, separately or jointly, can lead to the infer-
ence that the project of modeling the objective structure of 
reality is the proper subject matter of metaphysics.  
5 – Summary
Given that we do not know which scientific theories are ca-
pable of vindicating our metaphysical claims, we should con-
tinue doing metaphysics in a way that is not always aimed 
5 - Thanks to a referee for bringing this point to my attention.
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at unifying the sciences or offering models of the objective 
structure of reality. Even the ontic structural realist has ben-
efitted from metaphysics that is not in line with radically nat-
uralized metaphysics in their claims that reality is comprised 
of “patterns all the way down” (Ladyman and Ross 2007, p. 
228) and their more general attempts to develop Rainfor-
est Realism (Ladyman and Ross 2007). In particular, ontic 
structural realism requires a form of metaphysics that is not 
itself radically naturalized, including analytic metaphysics 
that offers ontic structural realists techniques for explicating 
opposing positions (if to serve only as rhetorical foils) (Dorr 
2010). It is obvious that metaphysics will not always be in line 
with science, but the cost of continuing to do metaphysics ap-
pears to be very low. Some believe that the potential cost is 
the taking away of bright minds from subjects that are per-
haps more pressing; it is this issue that leads Ladyman and 
Ross to “urge them to come back and rejoin the great epis-
temic enterprise of the modern civilization” (Ladyman and 
Ross 2007, p. 310). We should remind Ladyman and Ross 
that many of the great scientific and mathematical insights 
were accomplished by those (e.g., Einstein and Gödel) who 
whole-heartedly adopted the metaphysical enterprise of the 
sort that Ladyman and Ross wish to reject.
6 – Conclusion
What I have set out to accomplish here is to show that ontic 
structural realists such as Ladyman and Ross have underap-
preciated some of the ways that their own project has ben-
efitted from metaphysics, and that their attempt to formu-
late a regulative process for determining which metaphysical 
claims we should take seriously (in the form of the PNC) cre-
ates room for nearly any metaphysical project to be pursued 
given the possibility that it might aid some scientific hypoth-
esis (if not in providing direct support for the hypothesis, 
then perhaps in helping us better understand which hypoth-
eses we should not pursue). One might suggest that we drop 
‘might’ from the stipulation. I believe this would undermine 
much of science, though. Much of science involves surprising 
routes and we would not want to undercut our future endeav-
ors simply because we believe we have a good handle on what 
science will tell us in the future. For this reason, the ‘might’ 
clause allows room for science to continue its exploratory 
role.
 
Not all ontic structural realists endorse the idea that we 
should wait for science to tell us when a metaphysical claim 
will be useful. French (2014) invites us to “pillage” from 
metaphysics what we can make use of. This invitation indi-
cates that verification is not our only source of vindication (a 
lesson to be adopted from the fall of logical positivism), but 
more work is needed to determine if this invitation is worth 
accepting.
To sum up: There are metaphysical projects that don’t direct-
ly concern themselves with unifying the sciences or modeling 
the objective structure of reality. These metaphysical projects 
are still worthwhile. A method for distinguishing worthwhile 
metaphysics from others is still needed, something that I 
have not developed here. With these considerations, we come 
to realize that although radically naturalized metaphysics 
may not be the only kind of metaphysics worth doing, the 
allowance of other forms of metaphysics performs a greater 
service on its behalf.
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